CodeMirror/universal-android-debloater
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://gitlab.com/W1nst0n/universal-android-debloater.git synced 2024-05-20 06:52:20 +12:00
Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

Moved a package from Samsung to Misc

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
w1nst0n 2020-01-28 14:12:24 +01:00
parent aa4a11618a
commit 789fe803bb
1 changed files with 34 additions and 6 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

40
lists/Miscellaneous.sh
View file

@ -243,7 +243,6 @@ declare -a misc_bloat=(
"com.roaming.android.gsimcontentprovider"
# GSIM = Generic Statistical Information Model ? I don't think so but I can't find anything.
"com.s.antivirus"
# AVG Antivirus (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.s.antivirus) for Sony Xperia.
@ -274,12 +273,46 @@ declare -a misc_bloat=(
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TripAdvisor (see 'Controversy and fraudulent reviews' section)
# https://nypost.com/2016/03/01/why-you-should-never-ever-trust-tripadvisor/
"com.trustonic.tuiservice"
# The tuiService (Trusted User Interface) is a new security layer implemented by Trustonic.
# Allows a Trusted Application to interact directly with the user via a common display and touch screen, completely isolated from the main device OS.
# Seems like a good idea but it's closed source and "normal" devs can't use it for their apps.
# https://stackoverflow.com/questions/16909576/how-to-make-use-of-arm-trust-zone-in-android-application
# It is basically only used by manufacter sapps like Samsung Pay and for DRM stuff.
# Google implemented their own TUI in Android Pie : https://android-developers.googleblog.com/search/label/Trusted%20User%20Interface
#
# https://www.trustonic.com/news/blog/benefits-trusted-user-interface/
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_execution_environment
#
# If you're wondering, deleting this package will not cause security issues and will not break ARM TrustZone. It will break Trustonic TEE for sure
# but if you don't use Trusted Apps. You won't need this !
# Deleting this **may** reduce attack surface because yeah, Trustonic TEE isn't foolproof (as it was claimed)
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARM_architecture#Security_extensions
# https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/07/trust-issues-exploiting-trustzone-tees.html
# https://www.synacktiv.com/posts/exploit/kinibi-tee-trusted-application-exploitation.html
# https://blog.quarkslab.com/introduction-to-trusted-execution-environment-arms-trustzone.html
#
# Good ressources :
# https://medium.com/@nimronagy/arm-trustzone-on-android-975bfe7497d2
# https://www.gsd.inesc-id.pt/~nsantos/papers/pinto_acsur19.pdf
# https://blog.quarkslab.com/introduction-to-trusted-execution-environment-arms-trustzone.html
# https://medium.com/taszksec/unbox-your-phone-part-i-331bbf44c30c
#
# NOTE : Trustonic TEE (called Kinibi) is used in Samsung, Vivo, Oppo, Xiaomi, Meizu and LG devices.
"com.UCMobile.intl"
# UC Browser by Alibaba (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.UCMobile.intl)
# !! Unsecure chinese web browser !!
# https://www.quora.com/Whats-wrong-with-UC-Browser
# https://www.digitalinformationworld.com/2019/05/url-spoofing-uc-browser-android.html
"com.vlingo.midas"
# Speech recognition app forthe personal assistant by Vlingo
# Vlingo : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vlingo
# FYI : In January 2012 AndroidPit discovered that Vlingo sended packets of information containing the users GPS co-ordinates,
# IMEI (unique device identifier), contact list and the title of every song stored on the device back to Nuance without.
# Source : https://www.androidpit.com/Vlingo-Privacy-Breach
"com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.liveweather"
# Yahoo Weather (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.weather)
# Please boycott Yahoo ! (all of their services are crappy so it's not so difficult)
@ -476,8 +509,3 @@ declare -a misc_bloat=(
"com.trustonic.tuiservice"
"com.vlingo.midas"
"com.yelp.android.samsungedge"